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RECENT NATURAL RESOURCES CASE
Constitutional Law-Power of State To Designate
Game Preserves*
In Allen v. McClellan' the Supreme Court of New Mexico held
that the State Game Commission could not enforce its inclusion of
the plaintiff's privately owned twelve-acre plot in a game manage-
ment area; the commission had no statutory authority for such an
action. Furthermore, the court held that the taking was a violation
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the state consti-
tution. The court stated that the right to hunt is a property right,
subject to the uniform application of hunting regulations; therefore,
the state could not constitutionally take the property for a game
preserve without compensation of the owner. The court followed
the reasoning and authority of Alford v. Finch,2 a recent Florida
decision holding a similar taking unconstitutional:
The appellant has confused the ownership of the game in its wild
state with the ownership of the right to pursue the game. The land-
owner is not the owner of the game, ferae naturae, but he does own,
as private property, the right to pursue game upon his own lands.
That right is property, just as are the trees on the land and the ore
in the ground, and is subject to lease, purchase and sale in like
manner. . . . The predominant feature in the instant case is the
taking, with neither consent nor compensation, by the appellant
from the appellees, of a property right-the right to pursue the game
on their land.8
The state's authority to regulate the hunting of wild game has
* Allen v. McClellan, 75 N.M. 400, 405 P.2d 405 (1965).
1. 75 N.M. 400, 405 P.2d 405 (1965).
2. 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963).
3. Id. at 793.
NATUR.4L RESOURCES JOURNAL
been well established ol the theory of state ownership of game.'
Until Allen v. McClellan and Alford v. Finch, the taking of hunt-
ing rights on private lands without compensation or consent had
been held constitutional. The federal courts have held that the
right to hunt is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the
government; as long as the game refuge corresponds to biological
or geographic zones, the taking does not violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the Constitution.'
A leading federal case in this area is Bailey v. Holland,' in which
the Secretary of the Interior designated certain private property
as part of a game refuge under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.'
In reaching a decision favorable to the Secretary, the court held
that while such a designation may not single out a special tract of
land and place all similar adjacent lands in an opposite class, in
this case the act required the Secretary to consider the distribution,
abundance, economic value, and breeding habits of the migratory
birds in designating a refuge. The court found that the property
was situated, in fact, on a migratory route and resting place of
ducks and geese and was surrounded by a government owned ref-
uge. The taking was held not to be a violation of due process be-
cause private landowners hold no property rights in wild game;
wild animals are the exclusive property of the state.
In Lansden v. Hart,s a similar federal case, the question of prop-
erty rights in hunting was squarely presented:
The fact that plaintiffs have devoted real estate to, and developed
other valuable facilities for, the hunting of migratory wild fowl
has no bearing upon the point now under discussion. Under Sections
703 and 704 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, no hunting of mi-
gratory wild fowl whatsoever is legal except as permitted under the
regulations to be issued pursuant to said act. The larger purpose
of saving geese from slaughter in the very limited area where they
concentrate each year in such great numbers should prevail over the
fact that the plaintiffs might enjoy profits if such hunting were per-
mitted. At least regulations to that end are reasonable, rather than
arbitrary.9
4.) Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) ; 38 C.J.S. Game § 7 (1943), and cases
cited. For historical precedent, see 2 Blackstone, Commentaries 14 (1827).
5. E.g., Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942).
6. Ibid.
7. 49 Stat. 1555 (1936), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1964).
8. 180 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950).
9. 180 F.2d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 1950).
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Courts in California,' ° Colorado," Maine,' 2 Nebraska, 3 and
Washington 14 have reached the same result. The state holds title
to animals and birds in trust for all its citizens, and the legislature
may pass such laws as are necessary to protect certain species from
destruction. Most of the state decisions, however, hold that it is
not necessary that the area protected be unique, but only that the
game commission or the legislature make a thorough investigation
and careful selection of the preserve. 5 Some cases state that such
a designation is not a "local law" nor a denial of equal protec-
tion, because the privilege to hunt is withdrawn from everyone by
the state for that particular area.' The Maine court has stated
some of the reasoning behind the rule allowing the taking of pri-
vate property for a preserve:
The law ... does not take from him [the private owner] any title,
dominion of ownership or essential use. . . . The act does nothing
more than prohibit hunting and possession of firearms within the
preserve without taking any of the essentials of ownership.' 7
In Alford v. Finch,'" it is clear that similar adjacent lands were
placed in the opposite class. The commission designated the area
as a preserve while a nearby privately owned tract was to be opened
to limited hunting by the public and that land owner. Thus, the
commission's designation was unconstitutional by the standards
enunciated in Bailey v. Holland."
The New Mexico court in McClellan, however, did not have to
reach the constitutional issue. The case could have been decided
on the issue of the commission having exceeded its statutory powers.
The statute is not without ambiguity. Section 53-1-8 of the New
Mexico statutes gives the commission power to establish game ref-
uges, to purchase and lease land for the game refuges where suit-
able public lands do not exist, and to designate certain areas as
rest grounds for migratory birds Where hunting shall be forbidden.
10. Platt v. Philbrick, 8 Cal. App. 2d 27, 47 P.2d 302 (1935).
11. Maitland v. People, 93 Colo. 59, 23 P.2d 116 (1933).
12. State v. McKinnon, 153 Me. 15, 133 A.2d 885 (1957).
13. Bauer v. Game, Forestation & Parks Comm'n, 138 Neb. 436, 293 N.W. 282
(1940).
14. Cook v. State, 192 Wash. 602, 74 P.2d 199 (1937).
15. E.g., Maitland v. People, 93 Colo. 59, 23 P.2d 116 (1933).
16. Ibid.
17. State v. McKinnon, 153 Me. 15, 133 A.2d 885, 887 (1957).
18. 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963).
19. 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942).
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Sections 53-4-1 and 33-4-2 authorize the commission to acquire
land for public purposes by eminent domain, purchase, bequest, or
lease. In McClellan the court construed the above statutes to pre-
clude the commission's designation of migratory rest areas on pri-
vate land. 0 The rest areas could only be designated on public land
acquired by the methods provided by statute.' It is interesting to
note, however, that the California case of Platt v. Philbrick2 2
has interpreted a statute similar to New Mexico's as allowing the
designation on the ground that the power of eminent domain is
given so that the commission may have the greater control of own-
ership for some game preserves. There is no necessary contradiction
between the designation and purchase of game preserves. Designa-
tion only prohibits the landowner from hunting and does not, or
should not, prevent the landowner from developing his land within
reasonable zoning restrictions.23
41ford v. Finch24 and Allen v. McClellan25 both insist that the
right to hunt is a property right, subject to uniform regulation,
which cannot be taken without compensation. The right to hunt
has been regarded by the courts as a profit a prendre or property
right that may be conveyed in fee simple and is inheritable and as-
signable .2 The due process clauses of state and federal constitu-
tions provide that private property may not be taken for public
purposes without just compensation. However, in general terms,
the due process clause is simply a declaration that private property
shall not be converted to public property such as a public road, a
railroad, a public park, or public hunting grounds without compen-
sation.
The equal protection clause provides that individuals are entitled
to equal protection under the laws of a state. Its operation often
overlaps with due process. Equal protection does not require that
all individuals be treated equally; it requires only that any classifi-
cation be reasonable and nondiscriminatory. 7
20. 405 P.2d at 407.
21. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-4-1 to -2 (Repl. 1962).
22. 8 Cal. App. 2d 27, 47 P.2d 302 (1935).
23. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 130, § 27(A) (1965).
24. 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963).
25. 405 P.2d 405 (N.M. 1965).
26. Hanson v. Fergus Falls Nat'l Bank, 242 Minn. 498, 65 N.W.2d 857 (1954) ; see
38 C.J.S. Game §4 (1943). For historical precedent, see 2 Blackstone, Commentaries
418, 419 (1827), and the discussion in State v. Mallory, 73 Ark. 236, 83 S.W. 955, 957
(1904).
27. New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938).
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The generalization that a state owns game has led the state
courts28 to disregard the possible denial of equal protection. Clear-
ly, it is unfair to designate one farmer's land a game preserve and
allow his neighbor to sell hunting privileges. None of the state
cases, with the exception of the Nebraska case upholding the Platte
River preserve,29 have required a showing that the preserve coincide
with biological or geographical zones. The federal cases, however,
hold that the government may not single out a tract of land for a
game preserve and place similar adjacent lands in an opposite
class.80
Two recent Supreme Court cases have questioned the theory that
the state owns the game within its borders. In Toomer v. Witsell'
it was held that South Carolina's attempt to-keep Georgia shrimp
boats from her coastal waters violated the privileges and immu-
nities clause of the Constitution. The court reasoned that the clas-
sification of Georgia shrimp boats bore no relationship to any
proper purpose of the statute, such as conserving shrimp. South
Carolina argued that the state owned the shrimp within three miles
of her shore. After stating that shrimp are migratory and hence
do not belong to the state, the Court commented on the ownership
theory, advocating that more accurate language be used to describe
the state's power to regulate game: "The whole ownership theory,
in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in
legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have
power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important
resource.82 In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n88 the Court
decided that California could not exclude aliens from fishing in her
coastal waters. Again the Court was unconvinced by the ownership
argument, quoting Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland,8 4 the
case which upheld the federal government's supremacy in regulating
the hunting of migratory birds under the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act: "To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a
slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and
possession is the beginning of ownership."8 5
28. E.g., Cook v. State, 192 Wash. 602, 74 P.2d 199 (1937).
29. Bauer v. Game, Forestation & Parks Comm'n, 138 Neb. 436, 293 N.W. 282
(1940).
30. E.g., Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942).
31. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
32. Id. at 402.
33. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
34. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
35. Id. at 434.
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Generally, courts have granted legislatures wide discretion in their
use of the police power-the government's power to make regula-
tions not only for the protection, health, and safety of the public,
but also to promote its general welfare. An important Supreme
Court decision described the Court's role in reviewing police regu-
lations as follows:
The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of such an
enactment [police power], that every possible presumption is in favor
of its validity, and that, though the court may hold views incon-
sistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled unless
palpably in excess of legislative power.36
Examples of police regulations upheld by federal and state
courts include: statute requiring destruction of red cedars that host
apple rust ;37 legislation restricting the cutting of small trees on
wild or uncultivated land by private owners to prevent erosion,
conserve water, and the like ;3s regulations limiting the right of land-
owners to take oysters from private oyster beds;9 statutes regulat-
ing the method of drilling and the removal of natural gas to pre-
vent waste; 40 authorization of dams for the purpose of reclaiming
swamp lands where the effect was to oblige landowners to construct
and maintain dikes; 41 a requirement that a railroad build a new
bridge to allow greater drainage from a swamp; 42 regulations lim-
iting the quantity of land one may cultivate inside city limits;43
statutes permitting a municipality to zone property; 44 prohibition
against removing stones and gravel from private beaches to protect
the harbor; 45 a statute limiting the right to graze sheep on public
lands, 46 and regulations limiting fishing rights.4 7 The recent Massa-
36. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934).
37. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
38. In re Opinion of the Justices, 103 Me. 506, 69 At. 627 (1908).
39. Windsor v. State, 103 Me. 611, 64 At. 288 (1906).
40. Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind.
461, 57 N.E. 912 (1900) ; 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 229 (1948).
41. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
42. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. State ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
43. Town of Summerville v. Pressley, 33 S.C. 56, 11 S.E. 545 (1890).
44. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
45. Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55 (1896).
46. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907).
47. People v. Diekmann, 285 Ill. 97, 120 N.E. 490 (1918) ; see 36A C.J.S. Fish
§ 26 (1961).
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chusetts legislation preserving the state's coastal wetlands is based
on the state's police power.4
The principle to be drawn from these cases is that the govern-
ment may regulate the use of property where the purpose is to
promote the general welfare of the public; the regulations need
not be uniform as long as the classification bears a direct relation-
ship to the purpose of the statute and is not arbitrary. For instance,
the Supreme Court held that legislation regulating money order
establishments may not exempt the American Express Company
from the regulations. 9 The Toomer 0 and Takahashi5" cases are
other examples of unlawful classification.
The necessity for government regulation of game is obvious
and long acknowledged. Since the scarcity and abundance of game
will vary throughout a state, and migratory birds, for instance, may
rest in diverse areas of a state, different regulations for biologically
varied sections of a state clearly bear a relationship to the purpose
of the regulations-conservation of game. The wisdom, and to a
certain extent, the fairness of legislation creating or authorizing
the creation of game preserves on private lands by designation with-
out consent or compensation may be questionable. But the broad
language in Allen v. McClellan52 and Alford v. Finch"3 that any
such taking is unconstitutional, except on a uniform basis, is un-
tenable.
OAKES PLIMPTONt
48. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 130, § 27(A) (1965).
49. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
50. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
51. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
52. 75 N.M. 400, 405 P,2d 405 (1965).
53. 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963).
t Legal Assistant to the Director, The Nature Conservancy, Washington, D.C.
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